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RESUMO
Skinner (1938) uma vez definiu comportamento como um certo subconjunto de atividades do organismo – aquelas 
que envolvem intercâmbio com o mundo exterior. Neste artigo reexamino e reformulo a definição de Skinner para tornar 
mais explícito o quadro conceitual subjacente. Esse quadro resulta ser parcialmente morfológico e apoiado em conceitos 
biológicos de organismo e adaptação. Proponho uma reformulação da definição de Skinner numa perspectiva semelhante 
e ressalto a importância da pele, não apenas na vida de um organismo, mas na definição de seu comportamento.
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ABSTRACT
Skinner (1938) once defined behavior as a proper subset of organismic activities—those that involve commerce with 
the outside world. Here I reexamine and reformulate Skinner’s definition to make the underlying conceptual framework 
more explicit. This framework turns out to be partly morphological and to rely on biological concepts of organism and 
adaptation. I propose a reformulation of Skinner’s definition along these lines, and I underscore the importance of the 
skin, not only in the life of an organism, but in the very definition of its behavior.
Keywords: definition, behavior, environment, organism, boundary.
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The definition of behavior has been a 
controversial topic in behavioral and biological 
sciences, and little consensus seems to exist today 
(Levitis, Lidicker, & Freund, 2009). In behavior 
analysis, only a few definitions have been proposed, 
often with little justification or reflection on the 
rationale of the proposed definition. A significant 
exception to this trend is an early definition that 
Skinner proposed in The Behavior of Organism 
(1938). A property of Skinner’s definition that sets 
it apart from more recent ones is that it is not all-
inclusive with respect to organismic activities. Only 
the activities that in some sense “are having commerce 
with the outside world” (1938, p. 6) count as behavior 
on Skinner’s definition.
I do four things in this paper. First, I reexamine 
Skinner’s (1938) definition of behavior and I 
uncover the central idea behind it. This task is not 
as straightforward as it seems, because Skinner gave 
at least three different definitions in his book (see 
below). I assume that Skinner took his successive 
definition attempts to be be roughly equivalent, but 
such is not the case and the differences among them 
need to be discussed. Second, I analyze the conceptual 
framework that underlies Skinner’s central definition. 
This requires sizable elaboration. A definition along 
the lines that Skinner took up is rooted in biology 
(not behavior analysis) and relies on the concept 
of a morphological boundary between organism 
and environment. Because both of these conceptual 
aspects have been criticized by behavior analysts, I 
rebut their criticisms and defend Skinner’s biological 
and morphological orientation. Third, I sketch a 
reformulation of Skinner’s definition to make the 
underlying conceptual framework more explicit. The 
result is not so much a full definition as a set of criteria 
to separate, among organismic activities, those that 
quality as behavior from those that do not. Finally, 
I comment briefly on the conceptual implications of 
the criteria I propose.
Defining behavior
The concept that is most basic to Skinner’s work 
in The Behavior of Organisms (1938) is undoubtedly 
that of behavior. It is defined at the start of the book, 
before discussing the generic nature of stimulus 
and response, before distinguishing operant from 
respondent units, even before defining the concept of 
reflex. Here is the paragraph in which Skinner (1938) 
first defines behavior:
It is necessary to begin with a definition. Behavior 
is only part of the total activity of an organism 
[emphasis mine], and some formal delimitation is 
called for.  The field might be defined historically 
by appeal to an established interest. As distinct 
from the other activities of the organism [emphasis 
mine], the phenomena of behavior are held together 
by a common conspicuousness. Behavior is what 
an organism is doing—or more accurately what it 
is observed by another organism to be doing. But 
to say that a given sample of activity falls within 
the field of behavior simply because it normally 
comes under observation would misrepresent the 
significance of this property. It is more to the point 
to say that behavior is that part of the functioning 
of an organism which is engaged in acting upon or 
having commerce with the outside world [emphasis 
mine]. The peculiar properties which make behavior 
a unitary and unique subject matter follow from this 
definition. It is only because the receptors of other 
organisms are the most sensitive parts of the outside 
world that the appeal to an established interest in 
what an organism is doing is successful. (p. 6)
A shorter, separate paragraph, follows 
immediately:
By behavior, then, I mean simply the movement of 
an organism or of its parts in a frame of reference 
provided by the organism itself or by various 
external objects or fields of force. It is convenient 
to speak of this as the action of the organism upon 
the outside world [emphasis mine], and it is often 
desirable to deal with an effect rather than with the 
movement itself, as in the case of the production of 
sounds. (p. 6)
We can distinguish basically four different 
definitions (or definition attempts) in these 
paragraphs: behavior as (a) “what an organism is 
doing”; (b) “what it is observed by another organism 
to be doing”; (c) the “part of the functioning of an 
organism which is engaged in acting upon or having 
commerce with the outside world”; and (d) “the 
movement of an organism or of its parts in a frame 
of reference provided by the organism itself or by 
various external objects or fields of force.”
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Let us first clear up (a). Any reference to an 
organism’s “doings” in a definition of behavior, as 
in (a), should be rejected on the ground of obscurity. 
Some philosophers have taken the concept of “doing” 
to apply not only to purposive behavior but also to 
events such as slipping on the floor or falling down 
(e.g., Millikan, 1993). If this were the case, the 
concept of doing would be too broad to be useful 
in a definition of “behavior.” But one might just as 
well take the concept of doing to be too narrow. If 
Arnold commits suicide by jumping over the cliff, his 
jumping is his own doing, but his falling to the ground 
is not something that he does; rather, it is something 
that happens to him. Similarly, if Betty reacted to 
bad news by sweating profusely, no one would take 
her sweating as a case of “doing” (except perhaps 
as a joke: “What is Betty doing?”—“Sweating 
profusely.”). The concept of doing is so tightly linked 
with the notion of purposive behavior that one can 
hardly take the former as a non-circular definition 
of the latter. Taken as a definition of all behavior 
(purposive or not), the concept of doing fares even 
worse. 
Skinner’s second attempt at defining behavior, 
(b), adds an observational requirement to (a). To 
quality as behavior, an activity X must not only 
be what an organism is “doing,” it must also be 
observed as such by another organism. Note that 
Skinner formulates (b) in terms of actual, not 
merely potential, observation. Taken literally, this 
requirement seems absurd, since it excludes from the 
domain of behavior numerous cases of animal and 
human actions that have never observed by anyone. 
In all likelihood, however, Skinner meant definition 
(b) to be formulated in terms of observability rather 
than actual observation. Reformulating (b) along 
these lines, an organism’s doing X counts as behavior 
only if it can be observed by another organism; actual 
observation is not needed. And indeed, consistent 
with this interpretation, on the next line Skinner 
describes behavior as something that normally (but 
not necessarily) comes under observation. 
Regardless of the distinction between 
observation and observability, characterization 
(b) is not central to Skinner’s attempt at defining 
behavior. What is central to Skinner comes next, with 
characterization (c), a definition of behavior which 
appeal neither to an organism’s “doings” nor to their 
observability. According to (c), behavior is “that part 
of the functioning of an organism which is engaged 
in acting upon or having commerce with the outside 
world” (Skinner, 1938, p. 6, italics mine). Two 
elements make me conclude that definition (c) is the 
central one for Skinner. First, he uses (c) to ground 
the appeal to observation in definition (b). According 
to Skinner, an event does not qualify as behavioral 
because it is observable or easily observable, as 
(b) seems to suggests. The relation actually is the 
other way round. As Skinner explains at the end of 
his first paragraph, an organism’s behavior is easily 
observable because it is behavioral, that is, “engaged 
in acting upon or having commerce with the outside 
world”. Second, Skinner emphasizes that “the peculiar 
properties which make behavior a unitary and unique 
subject matter” derive from (c). Of characterizations 
(a) to (d), (c) is the only one that Skinner mentions in 
this respect. Accordingly, I take (c) to be Skinner’s 
(1938) basic definition of behavior, and it is the one 
I will defend.
Before defending and elaborating on (c), 
however, let me briefly comment on characterization 
(d), according to which behavior is bodily movement 
relative to the organism itself or an external frame of 
reference. This definition has been quoted to illustrate 
Skinner’s lapses into “mechanistic,” as opposed to 
“functional,” thinking (Gifford & Hayes, 1999, p. 
293). My own reason for criticizing (d) is that even 
though Skinner presents it a reformulation of (c), 
definitions (c) and (d) are actually non-equivalent. An 
electric eel’s stunning its prey, for example, involves 
“commerce with the outside world” in the sense 
of (c) but no bodily movement in the sense of (d)–
unless one takes “bodily movement” to include ionic 
currents inside the body, which I do not think is what 
Skinner (1938) had in mind. Here I will take (d) to 
be nothing more than an illustration of (c) in the case 
of the laboratory rats that Skinner used as subjects. 
The illustration is admittedly typical, but it is worth 
remembering that it does not encompass all forms of 
behavior in the sense of (c).
The behavior of organisms
According to (c), behavior involves an 
organism’s functioning plus the additional condition 
of “having commerce with the outside world.” 
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There is a good reason for mentioning the concept 
of organism in (c). All scientists study behavior in a 
broad sense, from the behavior of subatomic particles 
to the behavior of planetary systems. In spite of their 
profession’s name, however, behavior analysts do 
not analyze any kind of behavior. They do not study 
the behavior of electrons or that of slabs of concrete, 
for example, but the behavior of organisms. In fact, 
behavior analysts study the behavior of organisms in 
a tiny sample of animal species, chosen in part on the 
basis of their possible relevance to human behavior. 
In Skinner’s (1938) words:
In the broadest sense a science of behavior should 
be concerned with all kinds of organisms, but it is 
reasonable to limit oneself, at least in the beginning, 
to a single representative example. Through a 
certain anthropocentricity of interests we are 
likely to choose an organism as similar to man as 
is consistent with experimental convenience and 
control. (p. 47)
Because the concept of organism is basically a 
biological concept, definition (c) appeals to another 
science in order to circumscribe the research domain 
of behavior analysis. The dependency of definition 
(c) on the concept of organism has been criticized 
by Roche and Barnes (1997). Many of these authors’ 
criticisms are well taken but do not apply to definition 
(c), only to flawed extensions or misinterpretations of 
it. I agree, for example, that we should not attribute 
agency to the organism (Roche & Barnes, 1997, p. 
602) and that behavior analysts should not confuse 
their subjects, which are organisms, with their subject 
matter, which is not an organism (p. 603). We can 
also agree on the importance of history and context 
in behavior analysis (pp. 606-609). None of this, 
however, shows that there is something wrong with 
appealing to the concept of organism in delimiting the 
research domain of behavior analysis. 
Furthermore, Roche and Barnes’ (1997) own 
alternative to the organism concept is ultimately 
unsatisfying. They suggest that the type of behavior 
of interest to behavior analysts can be distinguished 
from other types, not by the nature of the systems 
involved but by the principles or laws on which 
behavior analysts focus (p. 602, p. 604). On this 
conception, a rat’s lever-pressing qualifies as 
“behavior” of the type of interest to behavior 
analysts, not because it involves a rat but because it 
adheres to principles of reinforcement (for example). 
The problem with this conception is that it inverts 
the relative positions of domain identification and 
theory formulation in behavior analysis. Domain 
identification came first. Skinner (1938) identified rat 
lever-pressing as behavior, and did so explicitly on the 
basis of definition (c), before formulating principles 
of reinforcement. Roche and Barnes’ formulation 
also fails to explain why behavior analysts consider 
operant and respondent principles to apply to the same 
research domain (namely, “behavior”) even when 
these principles are taken to be non-overlapping. 
The alternative is to recognize that different as they 
are, these principles are bound together in the same 
discipline because they apply to a single domain—
the behavior of organisms—that was understood as 
such before taking any stance on the kind of laws that 
would apply to it. 
Finally, invoking the concept of organism in 
the definition of behavior, as in (c), may be taken as 
a scientific strength of behavior analysis rather than a 
philosophical weakness. Any science is connected to 
other sciences—a “science” that is not so connected 
is probably not a science. Admittedly, “organism” 
is not a technical term in behavior analysis, and the 
term does not appear in the formulation of behavioral 
principles (Roche & Barnes, 1997). Rather, the 
concept of organism is part of the background 
connection between an antecedent science, biology, 
and the very definition of behavior. Once our definition 
of “behavior” is formulated, the concept of organism 
drops from behavioral principles without making the 
former less important at a foundational level.
Organism and environment
Definition (c) further involves the notion of an 
organism’s “commerce with the outside world.” Taken 
at face value, Skinner’s wording implies a conception 
of the organism with an inside and an outside, as 
well as a boundary or interface between the two. 
This morphological conception of the organism has 
been the target of philosophical criticisms reviewed 
ten years ago by Palmer (2004). This author’s main 
argument is that the distinction between organism 
and environment does not coincide with the skin 
or any other morphological boundary. Not only 
are the organism and its environment physically 
interpenetrated, they are also codependent in such a 
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way that they can only be defined as complementary 
poles in a single biological process (which Palmer 
terms, bioprocess). As a corollary of his insistence 
on a continuous bioprocess, Palmer champions the 
notion of an organism as an “ongoing organization 
rather than a skin-bound body” (p. 317).
The issues that Palmer (2004) discusses are 
profound. They are also complicated by the existence 
of different concepts of organism in biology (Pepper 
& Herron, 2008). On a conception of the organism 
defined merely in terms of genetic cooperation 
among parts (Queller & Strassmann, 2009), whether 
a biological entity qualifies as an organism is merely 
an issue of degree. Definitions of “organismality” in 
terms of genetic cooperation or coherence, however, 
neglect two fundamental features of the entities we 
commonly recognize as “organisms.” 
The first fundamental feature is spatial 
cohesiveness (Scheiner, 2010). The components 
of a typical organism do not float around but are 
maintained together by a membrane (in the case of 
unicellular organisms) or specialized mechanisms 
of cell adherence. Presumably, the presence of such 
mechanisms is not accidental but functional, in the 
sense of involving natural selection (Bonner, 1988). 
The second fundamental feature is the presence 
of a biological boundary between the inside of the 
organism and its outside (Wagner & Laubichler, 
2000). The boundary counteracts or regulates causal 
influences from the outside—causal influences that 
would otherwise have deleterious effects on the inside 
of the organism. This protective function is carried 
out by the cell membrane (in the case of unicellular 
organisms) and by the integument (in the case of 
multicellular organisms). Examples of integument 
are animal skin, the epidermis of plants, and the 
exoskeleton of insects. 
Because the boundary of the organism has 
protective functions, it is often described colloquially 
as a “barrier:”
The integument must act as a protective barrier; 
it helps shield the individual’s delicate, moist, 
internal tissues from a changing and often harsh 
environment that might otherwise infect the body 
with bacteria, freeze the body’s fluids, evaporate 
the body’s water, or mutate the body’s genes (Brum, 
McKane, & Karp, 1994, p. 542).
Far from being impermeable, however, 
this “barrier” allows material exchanges between 
organism and environment. Many invertebrates, 
for example, respire through their integument; they 
would quickly die if this were not the case. Arguing 
that the boundary is arbitrary, or perhaps even 
nonexistent, on the ground that it can be crossed 
would be fallacious. Far from being arbitrary, as a 
mere geometrical boundary would be, a biological 
membrane or integument is both morphological and 
functional. That (some) organisms have a biological 
boundary is no accident but, presumably, the result 
of natural selection (Maynard Smith & Szathmáry, 
1997). 
Because biological boundaries are permeable, 
it is not surprising that some of the materials present 
on the outside of the organism eventually end up 
inside (Palmer, 2004, p. 325). Neither is it surprising 
to find non-organic components in the integument of 
an organism (Sumner, 1922, p. 232). All organisms 
have components (such as carbon atoms) that are 
not alive in Muller’s (1966) sense of variation and 
multiplication with heredity. Actually, organisms 
are built of non-organic components. Finally, the 
organism, including its boundary, is in constant 
renewal. Within our skin, for example, cells constantly 
migrate toward the surface and die. The boundary can 
even change completely, as when insects molt; the 
dead boundary stops being part of the organism when 
it is no longer attached to it. Thus, to Palmer’s (2004) 
view of the organism as an “ongoing organization 
rather than a skin-bound body” (p. 317, italics 
mine) we can substitute that of an organism as an 
ongoing organization and a skin-bound body. There 
is no incompatibility between these two aspects of 
the organism; on the contrary, the boundary of the 
organism exemplifies both morphology and function 
(Wagner & Laubichler, 2000).
A definition (almost)
Here, then, is a possible reformulation of 
Skinner’s (1938) definition that explicitly links 
behavior and the skin. To quality as an organism’s 
behavior, an occurrence must at the very least:
(1) involve an effect at the organism’s 
boundary;
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(2) this effect must be the result of the 
organism’s internal activity;
(3) the type of causal relation from activity to 
effect must have a biological function;
(4) the effect at the boundary must be reversible.
The most obvious example of behavior 
according to these criteria is animal movement. 
Whether the whole animal moves or only a part of it, 
criteria (1) to (4) are fulfilled. The effect is a change 
in the shape of body surface (1), this change is the 
result of muscular activity (2), changes of body shape 
are a biological function of muscular activity (3), and 
the observed change is reversible (4). The absence of 
movement, however, as in standing still or freezing, 
also qualifies as behavior provided it fulfills (1-4). 
Notice that in humans and other animals, “the 
gut and the internal genital organs like the uterus 
are topologically part of the body surface” (Wagner 
& Laubichler, 2000, p. 26) or what I have called the 
organism’s boundary. Thus, any change that involves 
the gastrointestinal tract, for example, and fulfills 
criteria (1-4) qualifies as behavior—of a sort difficult 
to observe by others, admittedly, but behavior 
nevertheless. Breathing, eating, drinking, urinating, 
and defecating, are all activities that fill in or drain 
on bodily cavities (Lockard, 1964), and all qualify 
as behavior. Sweating also qualifies as behavior 
according to (1-4). In this case as well as Lockard’s, 
the effect defined in (1) consists of the boundary’s 
being crossed by bodily products. In the case of the 
electric eel stunning its prey, again an example of 
behavior according to (1-4), ionic currents inside the 
eel result in the boundary’s being crossed by a net 
flow of charge. Color changes in animal skin and the 
emission of pheromones (Millikan, 1993) also count 
as behavior when fulfilling (1-4).
Let us now have a closer look at what criteria 
(1) to (4) exclude from the category of behavior. 
Criterion (2), inspired by Dretske (1988), excludes 
passive changes of body shape such as  a student’s 
having his hand guided by the teacher. Criterion 
(3), inspired by Millikan (1993), excludes neural 
changes unaccompanied by motor output. At first 
sight, it seems that such activities (hereafter, silent 
neural activities) would fail to count as behavior 
merely by virtue of having no effect at the organism’s 
boundary. Even silent neural activities have physical 
effects at the organism’s boundary, however—minute 
electromagnetic effects arising from action potentials 
inside the brain. These effects usually go unrecorded 
but are nevertheless real; and what prevents an 
organism’s silent neural activity from counting as 
this organism’s behavior is not (1) but (3). In the case 
of silent neural activities, the causal relation from 
internal activity to electromagnetic effects on the skin 
has no biological function. That is, the presence of 
this causal relation in the organism’s ancestors never 
played any role in their reproductive success (Perlman, 
2010). By contrast, in the case of the eel stunning 
its prey electrically, as well as in the case of neural 
activities that eventuate in muscular movements, the 
causal relation from internal activity to effects at the 
organism’s boundary involves a history of natural 
selection, and qualifies as behavior according to (3). 
As in Millikan (1993), criterion (3) appeals to 
biological function, and ultimately adaptation through 
natural selection (Rose & Lauder, 1996), in defining 
behavior. A first difference between Millikan’s 
definition and mine is that (3) mentions effects at 
the organism’s boundary instead of effects on the 
environment or on the relation between environment 
and organism (Millikan, 1993, p. 137). A second 
difference is that (3) appeals to the function of a type of 
causal relation between internal activities and effects 
at the organism’s boundary, instead of a specific 
causal relation. A minor advantage of the present 
formulation is that it allows knee jerks, for example, 
to quality as behavior, whereas Millikan rejects them 
on the ground that they have no adaptive significance. 
Even though a knee jerk may be a spandrel (Gould & 
Lewontin, 1979), it still counts as behavior according 
to (3), however, because it involves a type of causal 
relation from neural activity to muscles to body shape 
that is globally adaptive. 
Finally, criterion (4), which focuses on 
reversibility, excludes a variety of developmental 
changes from the category of behavior (cf. Levitis, 
Lidicker, & Freund, 2009, p. 108). If your hair grow, 
for example, no change in the amount or nature of 
the internal activity that made them grow will make 
them “ungrow” (although you may cut them with a 
pair of scissors). By contrast, hair raising in terrestrial 
mammals is reversible and qualifies as behavior along 
the lines of (1-4). 
Now it should be admitted that in proposing (1-
4) I have fallen short of giving a definition of behavior. 
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Instead of saying what behavior is, I have listed four 
criteria that any episode must fulfill, minimally, in 
order to qualify as behavior; and, following Kantor 
(1924/1985, p. 5), I could have imposed further 
restrictions to distinguish the kind of complex 
behavior of interest to psychologists from simpler 
kinds. In all cases, behavior will involve activity 
with effects at the organism’s boundary. Why not 
go one step further and stipulate, along with Skinner 
(1938, p. 6), that behavior consists of activity with 
effects at the organism’s boundary? Because behavior 
analysts typically deal with the environmental results 
of organic activity rather than the activity itself. 
Think of the most well-known laboratory examples 
of operant behavior: lever pressing in rats and key 
pecking in pigeons. A rat cannot press a lever, and 
a pigeon cannot peck a key, unless a lever and a key 
are actually present in the environment. Thus, lever 
pressing and key pecking do not consist of muscular 
activities in and by themselves, but of achievements 
that involve surrounding objects. In Guthrie’s (1952, 
pp. 27-28) terms, lever pressing and key pecking are 
not movements but acts. 
For Skinner (1938), dealing with behavior as 
an achievement instead of the organism’ own activity 
may have been merely a matter of convenience (“it 
is often desirable to deal with an effect rather than 
with the movement itself”, p. 6). The fact remains 
that theorizing behavior in terms of the underlying 
activity rather than its environmental effects would 
entail dramatic changes with respect to most scientific 
practices in behavior analysis. Furthermore, the 
organism’s boundary being permeable, any internal 
activity with effects at the boundary will also have 
effects (however trivial) in the environment. Behavior 
being a prime example of continuous causal flow (or 
bioprocess in Palmer’s 2004 sense), how deep inside 
the organism its behavior starts, and how far away 
in the environment the organism’s behavior ends, are 
issues perhaps best left open. 
Concluding comments
Regardless of the distinction between 
movements and acts, the four criteria I have proposed 
make for a possible reconstruction of Skinner’s notion 
of “commerce with the outside world” (1938, p. 6). 
I believe the reconstruction to be both coherent and 
worthwhile, not only with respect to what it includes 
but also with respect to what it excludes. Consistent 
with our refusal to decide where behavior starts, 
neural activity that affects the organism’s boundary 
and follows (1-4) qualifies as an early component 
of behavior. Neural activities without motor output, 
however, do not follow (1-4) and accordingly are not 
behavior, not even part of it. 
Note well: I do not assume that all life forms 
that may count as organismic (slime molds, for 
example) must have a specialized boundary. Neither 
do I assume the impossibility of organisms (with 
their boundary) living inside another organism (with 
its boundary), as in symbiosis. Also, I realize that 
the concepts of boundary, inside, and outside are co-
defining. I do insist, however, on the importance of an 
organism’s having its own boundary in order to have 
its own behavior. If a colony of cells, for instance, 
has no boundary of its own, then its only boundary is 
the union of its cellular boundaries, and the behavior 
of the colony is nothing more than the union of the 
behavior of its cells. So a life form without its own 
boundary has no behavior other than the behavior of 
its parts. The skin is that important as a boundary, and 
even more than you think: No skin, no behavior of the 
organism.
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